Abstract the increasing demand for greater clinical accountability requires development of convenient tools to measure healthcare safety and quality, which are able to provide information contemporaneously. the purpose of this paper is to describe the development of the Hospital mortality Project, a quality assurance initiative designed to encourage and facilitate clinical accountability for hospital mortality by all clinical departments and clinicians. the project was carried out in two stages. Part : after registration of in-hospital patient deaths (1 may 2004 to 31 December 2007), the consultant in charge of patient care was notified and requested to assign the death to a predefined category. This categorisation leads to further investigation as appropriate. Part : Hospital administrative data from 1 April 1997 to 31 December 2007 were used to assess a defined index, the Hospital Mortality Index (HmI), which was the expressed in the form of an attribute Control Chart (p-CHart) and then used as a performance indicator for hospital departments and clinicians. Summary data are reported to the clinical departments and to the hospital executive via the Quality Improvement Committee on quarterly basis. the clinical review was complete for 2,990 of 3,132 (95%) inpatient deaths till 31 December 2007, while a further 142 (5%) deaths are still in the process of being reviewed as of 7 april 2008. the median age of all the cases was 78 years (IQr 67-86) of which 1,657 (53%) were male. the Poisson regression analysis showed that since 1997 departments with a minimum of 100 deaths in total showed no clinically significant change in HMI over time. the Hospital mortality Project provides a simple and efficient tool to analyse data for clinical managers to facilitate accountability.
Introduction
The public's trust in the provision of safe and high quality healthcare has been eroded since publication of the United States report 'To err is human' (Homsted 2000) , the Bristol Inquiry in the United Kingdom (Baker 2001 ) and the Quality of Australian Healthcare Study (Wilson et al. 1995) . The recent concern over the so-called 'Dr Death' failure of the healthcare system in Queensland (Australia) (Sandall 2005) demands national action to address the concerns about patient safety and the quality of Australian healthcare with in-hospital mortality being an initial priority. While the healthcare industry is far more complex than most process industries, it has lagged far behind in its efforts to measure performance routinely and continuously (Semmens et al. 2005) . It is generally agreed that clinical incidents or adverse events in healthcare are more likely to represent system failures rather than merely the careless or willful act of an individual (Stefl 2001) .
Clinical governance has emerged in recent years as the process whereby the quality assurance cycle as found in many industries becomes standard practice (Buetow & Roland 1999) . One focus of clinical governance is the audit of clinical practice, to identify system failures that have led to actual or potential patient harm. Identifying a high proportion of such events demands organisational commitment and processes that are likely to identify system Reviewed articles failures within the limits of the available human resources.
The increasing demand for greater clinical accountability has seen the development internationally and within Australia of quality assurance strategies that aim to provide high quality information for individual and systems level performance assessment. Four important examples of quality assurance initiatives that have been implemented in Australia during the last decade include the Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS) (Spigelman & Swan 2005) , root cause analysis of major adverse events in hospital (Quality and Safety Branch et al. 2006) , sentinel event monitoring (Office of Safety and Quality in Health Care 2006) and the Western Australian Audit of Surgical Mortality (WAASM) (Semmens et al. 2005; Semmens et al. 2006) . While all have contributed to the provision of information performance systems that have improved clinical care at the individual and systems level, none of these is able to provide ongoing institution or clinical department performance monitoring of in-hospital patient mortality contemporaneously. The use of hospital mortality data provides a convenient and acceptable starting point in the development of such performance monitoring systems (Semmens et al. 2005 ). In our hospital 3 to 4% of all inpatient admissions result in patient deaths and most deaths are the inevitable consequence of the disease process. However, as suggested by many others, by reviewing all in-hospital patient deaths it might be possible to identify otherwise unrecognised system failures. The challenge is to develop a method to allow this without consuming excessive time from otherwise heavily committed clinicians.
To complement the initiatives listed above, the purpose of this paper is to describe the development of the Hospital Mortality Project, a quality assurance initiative designed to encourage and facilitate clinical accountability for hospital mortality by all clinical departments and clinicians. Our objective was to introduce a cultural change (clinical accountability) where the treating clinician demonstrates the accountability for each death. The two-part process (Figure 1 ) requires the hospital Clinical Governance Unit to coordinate a self-administered audit that classifies each hospital death as one of six categories (see Table 1 ) and then determines and coordinates any further review required. The second part defines a performance indicator, the Hospital Mortality Index (HMI) as hospital mortality per unit time as a proportion of in-patients treated. This can be calculated from routinely collected administrative data. The HMI can be expressed as an attribute control p-CHART, a method commonly used in manufacturing industries to continuously monitor quality over time (Amsden, Butler & Amsden 1991) . The results are disseminated to clinical departments, clinicians and hospital management on a routine basis.
Method
The Hospital Mortality Project was developed as a collaborative initiative between the Clinical Governance Unit at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital (Nedlands, Western Australia) and health researchers in the WA Safety and Quality of Surgical Care Project (Semmens et al. 1998 ) at the School of Public Health, Curtin University of Technology. The process was initiated and coordinated by the hospital Clinical Governance Unit after an in-hospital patient death was registered on TOPAS (The Open Patient Administration System). TOPAS is a hospital patient administrative system which records summary discharge data for all inpatient episodes since 1996.
The present study is divided into two parts (Figure 1 ). In part one, a Death Audit system was established with data collected and analysed from 1 April 2004 to 31 December 2007. Part two involved analysis of administrative data for all 'Inpatients' (IPs), defined as any patient who was resident in hospital at 1200 hrs midnight, from 1 April 1997 to 31 December 2007. In-home inpatients, patients in nursing homes and patients discharged alive from hospital on the same day were excluded from the analysis. All deaths occurring within the hospital either on first day of admission or later were included in the analysis.
The project has been managed by a specifically created Hospital Mortality Project Database (HMP Database) in Microsoft Access (v2000). It is a split database system comprised of front-end and back-end data files. The HMP Database runs on a secure network and allows multiple users. It enabled the Clinical Governance Unit staff to: (a) import information from patient administrative system; (b) issue a proforma to the consultant in-charge in the event of an inpatient death; (c) document case details from the returned proforma; and (d) disseminate feedback reports to the head of the each clinical department and individual consultant in charge and to hospital executive via the Quality Improvement Committee.
Part 1. The death audit and review
Within 48 hours of a death the consultant in charge of the patient was sent a one-page proforma (the death audit) to complete. The clinician was requested to comment on, and categorise each in-hospital death as one of six groups (Table 1) . These categories were modified from the recommendations put forward by the Australian Health Roundtable Insight Group (Health Roundtable 2001). Category 4 was reworded for clarification and Category 6 was added. The form was then returned to the Clinical Governance Unit and data was entered in to the database. For deaths listed in Categories 1-3, no further review was generally recommended. For Categories 4-6 deaths, the hospital medical record was reviewed by the Clinical Governance Unit who then initiated further investigation if required such as root cause analysis or sentinel event reporting (Figure 1) .
Part 2. The p-CHART and HMI as a performance indicator
We used the method of an Attribute Control Chart, the p-CHART, to express the HMI for monitoring in-hospital mortality. The method required the collection of data which can be classified in a binary fashion such as acceptable/not acceptable (Amsden et al. 1991) . Hence in this instance 'p' represents the proportion or percent of deaths divided by IPs.
To establish the p-CHART and HMI, the following routinely collected hospital administrative data were obtained from the TOPAS -Patient unique identifier, department identifier, separation date, length of stay (LOS), death while admitted (Yes/No) and consultant in charge of patient.
This HMI was calculated on quarterly basis starting from January 1997 according to the formula: HmI = number of deaths ×100 number of IPs The proportions were plotted between the upper and lower control limits calculated using the formula (Amsden et al. 1991 The formulae for UCL and LCL represent three standard deviations (3SD) from the mean. On feedback reports we also plotted the lines representing two standard deviations (Figures 2, 3) . For interpretation purposes, proportions crossing 2SD were considered at an alert level, whereas proportions crossing 3SD were considered at an alarm level, although the responsibility for interpretation and action was left to the relevant clinical department and the hospital's Quality Improvement Committee.
Dissemination
Summary statistics from the Death Audit (part one) and p-CHARTS with HMI from part two of the study were disseminated to the head of each clinical department on a quarterly basis. The review included (a) a summary analysis of the compliance to the HMP; (b) the department p-CHART and HMI; (c) p-CHART and HMI for each consultant; and (d) a list of department deaths with proportion of category 4-6 deaths. The department head was responsible for disseminating the information to the consultants. The reports were also discussed in the Departmental Practice Review Committee for clinical interpretation. The outcome of this review was then provided to the hospital Quality Improvement Committee thence to the hospital executives.
Data analysis
Data analysis was performed using Microsoft Access (v2000), Microsoft Excel (v2000) and SPSS (v12.0.1, Chicago, IL). Poisson regression was used to examine the trend in the HMI over time for departments with a minimum of 100 deaths in total since 1997 to have a sufficient number of deaths for analysis over a ten year time period. The statistical package SAS (v9.1) was used to perform the regression analysis. Figure 2 . This report is only given to the Head of Department to review and compare the performance of all of the departments treating clinicians against the department's performance as a whole. A summary example of the data provided to each consultant is provided in Figure 3 . The consultant does not have access to the performance data of his/her fellow consultants and can only compare his/ her performance against the department performance. The Poisson regression analysis demonstrated that the HMI was generally stable over time (Table 2) . Several departments had statistically significant regression coefficients but all trend values were relatively small (Range= -3.78 to -1.00).
Discussion
The Hospital Mortality Project was established on the basis of lessons learnt from industry-based performance and quality assessment methodology. The method of auditing deaths in this study does not deal directly with degree of disease acuity of patients on admission to hospital and no attempt is made at case-weighting. Therefore, there must be caution in the interpretation of the data produced. Our system does not provide a 'cause and effect' relationship as we believe that data for a given clinical department should be interpreted in that department by the departmental head and also at a Departmental Practice Review meeting. Any apparent variations in departmental practice over time or individual practice should then be explained and reported to the hospital's Quality Improvement Committee and thus to the Hospital Chief Executive Officer. The Clinical Governance Unit or quality assurance unit which manages this process also flags any apparent practice variation and assures appropriate investigation of cases categorised.
We understand that categorising the deaths by the treating clinician can be subjective but our system aims to introduce a cultural change in clinical accountability where the treating clinician demonstrates the accountability for each death. The hierarchy of the process where the departments review individual consultant performance means that the results are interpreted by professionals who are most concerned or related with the outcome of patient care.
Although categorising the deaths into six categories was an attempt to perform simplified risk adjustment, we chose not to attempt case-weighting because a tool based on complex modeling and coded data is not readily attainable contemporaneously. We consider that it is absolutely critical to provide contemporary information and to adjust for comorbidities; the coding of patient data in our hospital may take few months to a year. Furthermore, the administrative data from hospital administrative system does not allow adjusting for more complex variables other than patient name, admission and date of death together with consultant and department of care.
Clinical governance has the twin tasks of accounting for the current status of healthcare quality and safety, and being part of the process of continuous improvement. We need convenient tools to measure healthcare safety and quality. It has been difficult to define appropriate, convenient, and numerical indicators of acceptable outcome. Death, however, as an indicator of healthcare outcome is objective, unequivocal and readily identifiable in a standard administrative dataset. We have therefore defined an index, the HMI, and have attempted to validate it as a usable indicator. The HMI uses routinely collected data available at the time of death for measuring the quality of clinical care. The core data set used to produce performance evaluation tables and graphs is collected by all hospitals and is readily obtainable for all hospital departments. This index may allow departments to recognise practice variations overtime. It may also allow comparison of analogous practice groups across hospitals.
The p-CHART provides a statistical process control chart which allows us to look at the behaviour of clinical departments and individuals over time. On a larger scale, it shows the care patterns of the departments and ultimately the hospital as a whole.
Our system represents a simple and practical computerised database that can be provided to other Clinical Governance Units to import routinely collected administrative data to run their own performance analysis. Periodic aggregate and identifiable reports can be provided to all heads of departments for performance review as well as to the individual clinicians. It should be noted that we do not interpret the p-CHART and leave it as a discussion tool for the departments. Our main aim is to give feedback to the hospital, department and individual consultants to examine their current practices. It is generally wrong to focus on individual behaviour when seeking an explanation for adverse events, since healthcare depends on teams rather than individuals and adverse events are much more likely to be system failures (NCEPOD 2008) . While there is much international focus on including case-adjusted data for clinical review and accountability, this process depends on assumptions, thus making clinician interpretation controversial. The model outlined in this paper has fewer assumptions and focused on a restricted, but efficient, robust process to analyse in-hospital mortality.
The costs to establish the HMP are minimal because the system uses the administrative data routinely collected by all hospitals. The system imports the data as input and generates reports as output. The objective part of the project requires little work but the form and information dissemination represents a modest workload. Through the success of this project we have also demonstrated that clinical accountability can be Reviewed articles facilitated with minimal additional resources. Clinicians and hospital medical staff are able to collect governance data while performing routine clinical tasks. After examining trends in HMI over time, we saw no major clinically significant effect of time on the proportion of deaths in different departments. All trend values were very small. Some departments did show statistically significant (although small) increases or decreases in the HMI over time. Some of the changes could be attributed to changes in data classification and work practices.
We consider that the unexpected and unexplained deaths can either be preventable or non-preventable. Because of the subjective nature of the category 6 it is one of the recommendations of this paper that all deaths classified as category 6 should be reclassified into one of the other five categories.
We had a very high compliance/support among doctors and hospital executives, inferring an advance towards positive cultural change. Our high compliance is probably due to the simplicity of the process while many other sentinel events reporting systems are still struggling with compliance and resistance issues arising from concerns regarding confidentiality, medical ethics and prolonged review times. The doctors are required to categorise the death by completing a simple proforma very close to the time of the death. Another reason could be due to the voluntary self-reporting nature of the system. We believe that the tool we have developed fits with the recommendations put forward by Kaiser Permanente Institute for Health Policy which states that reporting of medical errors will most effectively support actual improvement in patient safety within a system that is confidential, non-regulatory, non-punitive, and voluntary (Raymond & Crane 2001) . The HMP is hospitalbased and therefore able to arrange appropriate investigation of adverse events and to allow hospital executive to be accountable for safety and quality.
Future directions
In January 2008, the Clinical Governance Unit commenced assigning an internal death category in addition to the category assigned by the treating clinician. The internal categorisation is performed by consultants who are associated with the Clinical Governance Unit. In time, old cases will be updated retrospectively. This will allow us to perform the inter-reliability tests between the treating clinicians and internal categorisation.
A study to get the feedback from clinicians regarding the HMP is also under consideration. The objective of the study will be to evaluate whether participation in HMP has influenced clinical practice at consultant and hospital levels.
